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Abstract. In this study we have constructed a composite index of globalization of select 
Asian countries during 1970-2014 by minimizing the Euclidean norm of Shapley values of 
indicator variables contributing to the overall index. As a consequence, the mean expected 
marginal contributions of constituent variables to the overall index are approximately equal 
and thus, the overall composite index represents the constituent variables optimally. We 
call this index the Almost Equal Marginal Contribution (AEMC) index. We find that 
AEMC index and the KOF index of globalization are highly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.982).  
We find that Singapore, Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, Malaysia, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Japan have done very well and scored above 0.7. At the other end, Yemen, 
Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Nepal and Myanmar have scored below 0.5. Trends 
in globalization are increasing in general, but the rate of globalization, which accelerated 
after 1991, lost its momentum after 2007. Disparities in globalization, as measured by Gini 
coefficient over the countries under study, were more or less constant up to 1985 but after 
that they started declining. We have found that the index of globalization goes well with 
other socio-economic measures such as Economic Freedom Index, International Innovation 
Index, Social Progress Index, Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index, 
showing high values of Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s Rho. Its association with 
Democracy Index is rather weak but positive. It is almost uncorrelated with the Gender Gap 
Index. We observe, therefore, that globalization index is moving well with the indices of 
socio-economic condition in the Asian countries.  
Keywords. Globalization, Synthetic index, Asian countries, Shapley values, Equi-marginal 
contribution. 
JEL. C43, C71, F02, F60, O53. 
 
1. Introduction 
sia is a continent of heterogeneous climate, geography, population, culture, 
religion and politico-economic systems. It has 50 nation states, population 
and area wise heterogeneous. It also includes several partially recognized 
countries with limited to no international recognition and no membership of the 
UN. On the one hand it has very large countries with over 1.3 billion population 
such as China and India while on the other it has very small countries such as 
Bhutan, Maldives and Brunei with below million population. It has countries with 
very high population densities such as Maldives, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bahrain, 
and Bangladesh while it has countries like Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Bhutan and 
Oman with low population densities (Table 1). 
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Table. 1. Area, population, density of population, net migration and urbanization in Asian  
Country* Populn Density Area Migrn Urb Country* Populn Density Area Migrn Urb 
China 1409517 150 9388211 -339690 0.57 Azerbaijan 9828 119 82658 0 0.54 
India 1339180 450 2973190 -515643 0.32 Jordan 9702 109 88780 195057 0.68 
Indonesia 263991 146 1811570 -167000 0.53 Und. Arab Emir 9400 112 83600 96000 0.89 
Pakistan 197016 256 770880 -236384 0.38 Tajikistan 8921 64 139960 -20000 0.27 
Bangladesh 164670 1265 130170 -505297 0.35 Israel 8322 385 21640 3899 0.89 
Japan 127484 350 364555 71627 0.93 Hong Kong*  7365 7014 1050 14978 N.A. 
Philippines 104918 352 298170 -130000 0.44 Laos 6858 30 230800 -35498 0.41 
Viet Nam 95541 308 310070 -40000 0.34 Lebanon 6082 595 10230 250000 0.73 
Iran 81163 50 1628550 -80000 0.73 Kyrgyzstan 6045 32 191800 -27580 0.34 
Turkey 80745 105 769630 325434 0.71 Turkmenistan 5758 12 469930 -10000 0.48 
Thailand 69038 135 510890 33463 0.50 Singapore 5709 8155 700 67586 N.A. 
Myanmar 53371 82 653290 -94856 0.35 Palestine 4921 817 6020 -8750 0.72 
South Korea 50982 524 97230 33927 0.81 Oman 4636 15 309500 163500 0.73 
Iraq 38275 88 434320 92733 0.67 Kuwait 4137 232 17820 134000 0.87 
Afghanistan 35530 54 652860 89601 0.25 Georgia 3912 56 69490 -61054 0.59 
Saudi Arabia 32938 15 2149690 318000 0.77 Mongolia 3076 2 1553560 -3000 0.70 
Uzbekistan 31911 75 425400 -13294 0.34 Armenia 2930 103 28470 -6107 0.64 
Malaysia 31624 96 328550 156330 0.74 Qatar 2639 227 11610 120400 0.91 
Nepal 29305 204 143350 -74474 0.19 Bahrain 1493 1964 760 8400 0.82 
Yemen 28250 54 527970 -15002 0.33 Timor-Leste 1296 87 14870 -10001 0.31 
North Korea 25491 212 120410 -5403 0.61 Cyprus 1180 128 9240 4502 0.67 
Taiwan* 23626 667 35410 34000 0.77 Bhutan 808 21 38117 2000 0.38 
Sri Lanka 20877 333 62710 -96954 0.19 Macao* 623 20752 30 8470 0.95 
Syria 18270 99 183630 -831579 0.72 Maldives 436 1454 300 4383 0.39 
Kazakhstan 18204 7 2699700 31961 0.50 Brunei 429 81 5270 406 0.78 
Cambodia 16005 91 176520 -30000 0.21 Total 4504428 145.149 31033131 -1096909 0.48 
Note: Countries* = This table includes independent countries as well as dependencies. Population in 000 persons;  
Area in Sq. Kilometres; Density in population per sq km;  Urb* = Unban population as % to total population; 
Migrn = Net migration No. of people 
 
2. Income and inequalities 
In the economic realm, Asia is no less heterogeneous. Per capita income in 
Qatar is very high, making it the richest country in the world. The main source of 
income in Qatar is petroleum and gas which accounts for more than 70 percent of 
the Govt. revenue, more than 60 percent of GDP and about 85 percent of the export 
earnings. Qatar has progressed towards establishing petrochemicals based 
industries along with steel and other construction materials. The second richest 
country (as to per capita GDP, see Table-2) is Singapore, a conglomeration of 
almost completely urbanized small islands, considered as a global commerce, 
finance and transport hub. Its standings include: the most "technology-ready" 
nation, top International-meetings city, the city with "best investment potential" on 
account of being a ‘tax heaven’, second-most competitive country, third-largest 
foreign exchange market, third-largest financial centre, third-largest oil refining 
and trading centre and the second-busiest container port.  The third in the list is 
Brunei, an industrialised country that amassed wealth from extensive petroleum 
and natural gas fields. It has very high Human Development Index (among the 
Southeast Asian nations) and is classified as a "developed country". Brunei is not a 
democratic country. Its political system is governed by the constitution and the 
national tradition of the Malay Islamic Monarchy. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Oman and Japan are other rich countries. However, on the bottom side of the list, 
there are several poor countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Nepal and Yemen with per capita income less than Int$4000.   
  
Table 2. Select  Asian countries by GDP(PPP) per capita (in Int$) 
SL# Country GDP_PC SL# Country GDP_PC SL# Country GDP_PC 
1 Qatar 127660 14 Russian_Fed. 26490 27 Armenia 8621 
2 Singapore 87855 15 Kazakhstan 25145 28 Bhutan 8227 
3 Brunei 76884 16 Turkey 24912 29 Philippines 7728 
4 Kuwait 71887 17 Lebanon 18525 30 India 6616 
5 United_Arab 67871 18 Iran_Isl_Rep. 18077 31 Vietnam 6429 
6 Saudi_Arabia 55158 19 Azerbaijan 17439 32 Myanmar 5832 
7 Bahrain 50704 20 Thailand 16888 33 Pakistan 5106 
8 Oman 46698 21 China 15399 34 Bangladesh 3891 
9 Japan 41275 22 Jordan 12278 35 Cambodia 3737 
10 Korea_Rep. 37740 23 Mongolia 12275 36 Kyrgyzstan 3521 
11 Israel 35179 24 Sri Lanka 12262 37 Tajikistan 3008 
12 Cyprus 34970 25 Indonesia 11720 38 Nepal 2479 
13 Malaysia 27267 26 Georgia 10044 39 Yemen 2375 
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Table 3. Income Inequality in Select Asian Countries as measured by Gini Coefficient 
Country Gini Coeff Year Country Gini Coeff Year Country Gini Coeff Year 
Malaysia 46.26 2009 Sri Lanka 38.58 2012 Japan 32.11 2008 
Philippines 43.04 2012 Iran 37.35 2013 Bangladesh 31.98 2010 
Israel 42.78 2010 Yemen 35.89 2005 Armenia 31.54 2013 
China 42.06 2010 Arab Rep 35.77 2004 Tajikistan 30.77 2009 
Russia 41.59 2012 Indonesia 35.57 2010 Cambodia 30.76 2012 
Turkey 40.17 2012 Cyprus 34.31 2012 Pakistan 29.59 2010 
Georgia 40.03 2013 India 33.90 2009 Kyrgyzstan 27.37 2012 
Thailand 39.26 2012 Mongolia 33.75 2012 Kazakhstan 26.35 2013 
Vietnam 38.70 2012 Jordan 33.66 2010 Azerbaijan 16.64 2005 
Bhutan 38.65 2012 Nepal 32.75 2010 Median Gini 34.31 2012 
Source: [Retrieved from].  
 
Table 4. Population living below national Poverty Line in Select Asian Countries 
SL# Country % Ppn Year SL# Country % Ppn Year SL# Country %  Ppn Year 
1 Tajikistan 46.7 2009 10 India 22 2015 19 Indonesia 12.5 2011 
2 Yemen 34.8 2005 11 Bangladesh 18.5 2010 20 Sri Lanka 8.9 2010 
3 Kyrgyzstan 33.7 2010 12 Turkey 18.1 2009 21 Kazakhstan 8.2 2009 
4 Cambodia 30.1 2007 13 Georgia 17.7 2011 22 Azerbaijan 7.6 2011 
5 Mongolia 27.4 2012 14 Pakistan 17.2 2006 23 Malaysia 3.8 2009 
6 Nepal 25.2 2011 15 Vietnam 17.2 2012 
- 
Estimated with % Pn Living under 
$3.10 a day (Not Poverty Line) 7 Philippines 25.2 2012 16 Jordan 14.4 2010 
8 Bhutan 23.2 2007 17 Thailand 13.2 2011 24 China 2.5 2013 
9 Armenia 22.6 1995 18 Russia 12.7 2011 25 Iran 1 2013 
Note: (1). Data not available for other countries under study. (2) Source - Wikipedia: List of countries 
by percentage of population living in poverty. 
 
Nevertheless, high per capita income at the country level does not imply the 
well-being of people in the lower income brackets. Although much quantitative 
information is not available on the income distribution in all Asian countries, 
telling inequalities are pervasive. It is reported that Qatar's income per person is 
among the World's highest. But income is unequally distributed: the richest Qataris 
receive over 13 times as much as the poorest (The Economist, 2011). Singapore 
has acute inequalities. It is reported (The Economist, 2015) that as measured by 
Gini coefficient, Singapore is among the world’s most unequal countries, although 
the figure may not be fully comparable with those of the other countries because of 
the facts that first, Singapore is almost wholly urban, secondly that the inequalities 
are computed there by excluding shorter-term foreign workers and non-working 
families and lastly that income includes employers’ CPF contributions also, which 
are capped for higher-paid workers. If the Gini coefficient for Singapore is adjusted 
for these factors, it could be lesser in magnitude.  Interestingly, elsewhere (States 
Times Review, 2017) we find that Singapore has the Gini coefficient 0.458 in 
2016. In that case it is comparable to Malysia (Table-3) unless income inequality 
figure for Malaysia has dropped since 2009 or the statistics are not much reliable 
for either country. For Brunei it is reported (Reddit.com, 2014) that the level of 
inequality in household income distribution has dropped significantly over the last 
two decades. The Gini coefficient value decreased from 0.534 in 1987-1988 to 
0.413 in 1997-1998 and to 0.355 in 2005. The share of income for 40 per cent of 
the poorest households increased from 11.3 per cent in 1997-1998 to 14.6 per cent 
in 1997-1998 and to 17.4 per cent in 2005. The share of income for 40 per cent of 
middle-income households also increased from 29.6 per cent to 37.2 per cent and 
to 40.7 per cent in the same years. In line with the increase, the share of income for 
the 40 per cent of the richest households has decreased over the period. In Hong 
Kong it is reported that in 2011 the Gini coefficient of income distribution was as 
high as 0.537 (Wikipedia: List of countries by income equality) and according to 
the UN estimate the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 
10% was 17.8 while the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% to the 
poorest 20% was 9.7. It is also important to look into the statistics on poverty 
(Table 4). In the countries such as Tajikistan, Yemen and Kyrgyzstan over 1/3rd of 
the population lives below poverty line as defined by the respective countries.    
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3. GDP growth rate 
In Table-5 we present the countries under study in a descending order of growth 
rate in the real GDP (2016). While the leading countries are Nepal, India, 
Bangladesh, Thailand, Philippines, China, etc., the trailing countries are Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Brunei and Yemen. However, it may be pointed out that GDP 
growth rates are very volatile and little reliable indicators. Most of the countries in 
Asia have a large income from agriculture sector that depends on vagaries of 
nature. They also have a large unorganized (or informal) sector in manufacturing 
and service sectors. Moreover, the reliability of real GDP statistics depends on 
accuracy of accounting and this accuracy depends on the level of development of a 
country. Underdeveloped economies are generally poor at accounting.   
Morgenstern (1962) referring to Kuznets remarks that average error in income 
(GDP) estimates could not be less than 10 percent (in case of USA, a developed 
country). While error in basic manufacturing and public utilities sector could be 
less than 10 percent, in agriculture, mining, trade, banking, insurance, etc. it could 
be between 10 to 30 percent and in the sectors such as direct services, construction, 
real estate, etc. error could be above 30 percent. As to growth rates of GDP over 
the years, say t0 and t1,  the range [min(Y1)/max(Y0)] and [max(Y1)/min(Y0)], where 
Y0 and Y1 are the income figures for the years t0 and t1 respectively, would 
determine the range in which the income ratios of the two years would lie. To 
illustrate, suppose in t0 GDP is $100±10 and in t1 it is $110±10. Then growth rate 
will lie between (100/110-1) and (120/90-1) or -9.09 ≤ g ≤ 33.33 percent.  
Furthermore, different countries have different ways to estimate their GDP. In this 
regard it is pertinent to consider the observation made by Morgenstern (1962, p. 
42): ‚International comparisons are constantly being made. .... Yet we need only to 
look at numerous United Nations publications to see that this is being done for the 
whole world without any further excuse. The most startling use - or rather abuse - 
is for determining allegedly comparable growth rates for different countries, on the 
basis of which far-reaching policy decisions are made.‛  
Secondly, the growth rates in GDP are indicative of neither development nor 
welfare. Most of the rich/developed countries, which also have better welfare status 
of their people, have low real GDP growth rate. Some examples are: Sweden and 
Netherland have 3.30% real GDP  growth rate (in 2016) and the countries such as 
Germany, U.K., U.S., Canada, Belgium, France, Denmark, Japan and Norway  
have 1.8% Real GDP growth rate or even less than that. 
 
Table 5. Select  Asian countries by GDP Growth Rate in the Year 2016 
Sl# Country RGDPGR Sl# Country RGDPGR Sl# Country RGDPGR 
1 Nepal 7.56 14 Pakistan 4.71 27 Jordan 2.1 
2 India 7.1 15 Sri Lanka 4.3 28 Singapore 2 
3 Bangladesh 6.92 16 Malaysia 4.2 29 Kyrgyzstan 2 
4 Thailand 6.9 17 Israel 4 30 Saudi_Arabia 1.4 
5 Philippines 6.8 18 Bahrain 4 31 Tajikistan 1.4 
6 China 6.7 19 Oman 4 32 Kazakhstan 1.1 
7 Iran 6.54 20 Turkey 3.2 33 Lebanon 1 
8 Bhutan 6.5 21 United_Arab 2.9 34 Japan 1 
9 Vietnam 6.4 22 Cyprus 2.8 35 Armenia 0.2 
10 Myanmar 6.3 23 Korea_Rep. 2.8 36 Azerbaijan 0 
11 Mongolia 5.5 24 Qatar 2.7 37 Russian_Fed. -0.2 
12 Cambodia 5.5 25 Georgia 2.7 38 Brunei -1.2 
13 Indonesia 5 26 Kuwait 2.5 39 Yemen. -28.1 
 
Whatever be the status of economic prosperity of a few rich countries in Asia 
that have geological fortune and location advantages, they jointly house not more 
than 2.5 or at most 3 percent of total population in Asia.  Other countries have to 
prosper by being industrious as well as by exploitation of comparative advantages. 
Some counties have exhibited such efforts and hence Japan, Israel, South Korea 
and Russia have developed and, China, Philippines, Cyprus, Turkey, India, 
Thailand, Vietnam, etc. have made significant progress. On the other hand, there 
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are many countries yet to make any significant headway to fast economic 
development.   
 
4. Issues in economic development of Asian countries 
Economic development is based on four fundaments: (1) availability of natural 
resources, (2) availability of physical, financial and human capital, (3) technology 
and innovativeness, and (4) favourable institutions. Most of the development 
theories have stressed on the one or the other fundamental, undermining the role of 
the other fundamentals, taking them for granted.  It may be noted that, first of all, 
many less developed countries may not have abundant natural resource and 
secondly, even if they have, they may simply export them without developing any 
processing industries or the industries that have strong backward linkage to the 
available resources. This is because the rest of the three fundamental factors may 
not lend support to development of such industries. 
The theories that stress on physical/financial capital suggest to enhancing 
domestic savings or permitting foreign capital to flow in either by way of loan or 
investment. It is assumed that the investment would be made to utilize natural 
resources in accordance with the comparative advantage. It is also assumed that 
technology and skilled manpower to apply that technology would readily be 
available and institutions are all favourable to allow the capital/investment to 
operate with considerably high efficiency.  However, there are catches in the logic. 
Inflow of foreign capital to the less developed countries is constrained, which is 
known as the Lucas paradox (Lucas, 1990) and Feldstein-Horioka puzzle 
(Feldstein & Horioka, 1980; Alfaro et al., 2005), due to uncertainties as well as 
issues such as technological incoherence, unavailability of infrastructure and 
human resources, institutional factors and government policies at the destination 
countries. This has been widely experienced in African as well as in Asian 
countries. In absence of inflow of foreign capital, domestic savings and investment 
become highly correlated. When income is low, efforts to raise domestic savings 
by curtailing consumption may adversely affect human capital and its efficiency 
(Myrdal, 1972: p. 54) offsetting the benefits of investment based on domestic 
savings. This interlocking is difficult to break.  
Financing development activities through borrowing from the international 
organizations also has not borne much fruit except that the burden of debt kept on 
escalating over time. It created a sort of dependency on financers, dictating the path 
of development a country could choose. It is well known how India had to go in for 
reforms and restructuring in 1991 (Mishra & Kumar, 2013).     
Technology is relatively easy to bring in, but the management and the 
availability of skilled human resources to adopt the technology to its full efficiency 
are constrained by other factors. Such technologies are also capital intensive and it 
has its bearing on the low level technology prevailing in the less developed 
countries. This brings about social dissatisfaction and political resistance. 
Education system is not in coordination with the technologically modern industrial 
requirements, nor is it easy to restructure education system on account of 
unavailability of trained manpower.  Hence, educational expansion is often leading 
to deterioration of quality and further divergence from the industrial requirements. 
Innovativeness is choked by social circumstances, unsupportive government 
policies, unavailability of institutional finance, poor infrastructure and uncertainty 
of market conditions. As to human capital, literacy and education is quality-wise 
poor and unhelpful in imparting skill and employability, not to mention an ability 
to carry out critical evaluation. The intelligentsia is either incapable or indifferent, 
if not opportunistic or supporting the coalition (Rudra, 1989) that thrives on the 
mass poverty and perpetual underdevelopment. Due to poor health infrastructure, 
deplorable sanitation facilities, deficient waste disposal system and poverty a large 
part of the population also has poor health conditions.    
Many Asian countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Yemen, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Oman, Kazakhstan, China, Qatar, Russia, Vietnam, Kuwait, 
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Armenia, and Jordan) are authoritarian.  Some of them (such as Pakistan, Lebanon, 
Thailand, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Bangladesh and Georgia) are hybrid 
regimes (hybrids of authoritarian and corrupt democracies) where consequential 
irregularities exist in elections regularly preventing them from being free and fair, 
where governments apply pressure on political opponents, judiciaries work under 
govt. pressure, where there is widespread corruption, media are not permitted to act 
independently, political culture is underdeveloped, and there are issues in the 
functioning of governance. Only a few (Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Israel, South Korea) are 
democracies, although flawed democracies.  Flawed democracies are nations where 
elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues 
(e.g. media freedom infringement). Nonetheless, these nations have significant 
faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low 
levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance (The 
Economist, 2015). Most of the Asian countries are ‘soft state’ of Gunnar Myrdal 
whether the Asian countries hate, like or exhibit an indifference to that 
qualification. These countries, observes Myrdal (1970, p. 211), cannot impose the 
right development policies. Soft state signifies a country wherein the various types 
of social indiscipline which manifest themselves by deficiencies in legislation and, 
in particular, law observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by 
public officials and, often, their collusion with powerful persons and groups. It also 
refers to widespread practices of rent-seeking and corruption not taken much 
seriously or pro-actively by the society, administration or even the legal system. 
Their political system is often corrupt, or it supports corruption and is unwilling to 
act against corruption at all levels. This state may be attributable to the past 
colonial rule and the vacuum created by their departure which could not properly 
be filled afterwards due to many reasons including vested interests. This was also 
due to the persistence, even after independence, of an attitude of disobedience to 
any authority which was historically central to the nationalist politics against the 
colonial powers. These observations of Myrdal are often overlooked. As Maharatna 
(2010) opines, it is ‚a misfortune that the notion of ‘soft state’ as pioneered by 
Gunnar Myrdal had received at its advent unduly harsh and certainly very hasty 
criticisms from the then influential scholars and political leaders of India and 
elsewhere. Consequently, profusely insightful and useful suggestions and advices 
emanating from the Asian Drama, particularly towards a more effective 
functioning of the state, had been summarily flouted by the then dominant 
leaderships and governments—albeit at colossal peril of many countries’ 
subsequent development trajectories. Similarly costly should have been the callous 
neglect and indifference on the part of academics and political leaders alike 
towards Myrdal’s incisive analysis and understanding of the growing phenomenon 
of corruption in many newly independent countries in Asia.‛ Overall, most of the 
Asian countries have deficient social capital (Putnam, 1995; 2000). It is important 
to note that social capital can neither be borrowed nor imported. It cannot easily be 
cultivated due its complexity, non-material nature and its being housed in the mind 
of the people or the social psyche (obshchestvennaia psikhika) that regulates 
people’s attitudes and conducts often without their being conscious of its influence. 
 
5. Recent thrust to development through globalization 
After the dissolution of the USSR, many countries in Asia resolved to try with 
‘globalization-led development’ (Mishra, 1917a). This is partly because ‘planning-
led development’ or ‘borrowing-led’ development did not bear much fruit for 
several decades. In the globalization program the economic part relates to 
promoting the flow of goods and services, financial resources and investment 
across the national borders and reduction in restrictions on such flow by means of 
tariff, taxes and other barriers.  The social part of the globalization is concerned 
with movement people, information, ideas and culture and connecting the people 
across the national boundaries. To facilitate these two types of flows and to reduce 
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restriction on them, it is required that necessary political connectivity and 
functionality should be there for which embassies, membership in international 
organizations, international treaties, etc. are needed. It is expected that while 
economic part would stimulate flow of goods, services, finance, capital and 
technologies in which sphere decision-making will not be limited on the basis of 
nationality. The socio-cultural aspect of globalization would inculcate 
modernization ideals, innovativeness, openness of mind, awareness to 
opportunities, cosmopolitanism and knowledge capital as well as it would reduce 
many biases that are caused by a closed mindset.  
It is not that such flow of goods, finance, capital, technology, people, ideas, 
culture, etc. was not there before 1991.  Colonization of the countries in Africa, 
Asia and elsewhere did connect the colonized countries for transfer of material 
resource, technologies, people, ideas and culture. However, the motive force of 
establishing such connections and transfers were exploitation and imperialism 
rather than development. Moreover, such transfers were not based on a wilful 
exchange among the parties. After the Second World War, when many colonies 
became sovereign states, such interactions were there. By way of exports and 
imports goods crossed boundaries. Ideas and innovations originating in developed 
countries did percolate to less developed countries. Technology transfers and 
adaptations did take place. Yet, such interactions were not considered as an engine 
of growth or development.   
After the fall of the USSR, the 3-Worlds picture was reduced to the 2-Worlds 
picture in which there are developed countries and underdeveloped (developing) 
countries, most of them managing their economies on the market principle. Now, 
development of underdeveloped countries is not a ‘white man’s burden’, but a 
transformation based on wilful exchange among the parties involved that may turn 
out to be in the interest of all the parties. Development (economic, social and 
political) of the Asian, African or Latin American countries is necessary for the 
developed countries so that the capital of the latter find destinations where they can 
be more productive (and overcome Lucas paradox) as well as the market for the 
products that the latter produces. This development is necessary for the developed 
countries so that their capital finds natural as well as human resources cheaper to 
operate upon, beyond their own national boundaries and they also find the markets 
to dispose the produce off, beyond their own national boundaries, and bring home 
only the profits.  The underdeveloped countries are interested in such a program 
because they have failed to find enough capital (at home or borrowed from 
elsewhere), entrepreneurs and skilful management to operate on their natural 
resources for generating sufficient income and employment in order to bring 
themselves out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment. It is also expected that 
such an arrangement would transform the domestic business environment in the 
underdeveloped countries.     
 
6. Measurement of the degree of globalization 
A number of indices have been devised that may be used to assess the extent of 
globalization of different countries and also study the trends in globalization over 
time. Since globalization is a multifaceted concept, such indices of globalization 
are often obtained by a weighted aggregation of several indicators of globalization 
in different dimensions. Samimi (2011) reviews a number of such indices among 
which Vujakovic (2010) and KOF (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) indices of 
globalization are noteworthy.  
The KOF index of globalization has been constructed for many countries for 45 
years (1970-2014) on an annual basis and, thus, greatly facilitating a study on the 
trends of globalization for a large number of countries.   It visualizes three aspects 
of globalization; economic, social and political. The economic dimension (E) of 
globalization takes into account: (1). E1 - actual economic flows such as trans-
border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, and (2). E2 - restrictions 
on trans-border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. 
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They are synthesized to make E. The social dimension (S) takes into account: (1) 
S1 - trans-border personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, 
postal interactions, etc., (2) S2 - flow of information, and (3). S3 - cultural 
proximity. They are synthesized to make S. The political dimension has only one 
aspect, P. At the second stage, E, S and P are synthesized (by a weighted 
aggregation) to give the KOF Index of globalization (Mishra, 2017b).  
However, the enterprise of construction of composite indices by a weighted 
aggregation of indicators in varied dimensions is vexed with the problem of choice 
of weights to be assigned to different indicator variables. When weights are 
assigned subjectively (based on expert opinion) it faces the criticism of inducing 
subjective biases. Yet, when weights are assigned by any so-called objective 
method (that derives them from the data itself through some statistical/ 
mathematical method) they may not fall in line with the pre-conceived 
(theoretically sound or otherwise) notion of importance that the analyst holds.  
Even if the importance of different indicators assessed by the analyst is correct, it is 
not necessary that the data and the method that operates on them to derive weights 
would fulfil the expectations of the analyst. The reasons for this divergence are 
varied. Data are the figures emanating from facts. Data are collected by following 
some concepts and they are constrained by many factors. There can be a great gap 
between concepts and facts. Of what sort and how much of information on facts, 
filtered by what sort of precepts, gets converted to quantitative data ultimately 
determines the extent to which figures can stand for facts.   
Popularly, different indicators are assigned weights such that they are some 
function of Pearson’s correlation coefficient or covariance among different 
indicator variables.  The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is based on such 
correlation (or covariance). It maximizes the Euclidean norm of correlation 
coefficients between the composite index and the indicator variables. On this 
account two questions can be raised; first how to measure correlation, and the 
second why the Euclidean norm?  There are many measures of correlation 
including Pearsonian correlation, Bradley’s absolute correlation, Spearman’s rank 
correlation and so on up to Szekely’s Distance (Brownian) correlation (Mishra, 
1914). Similarly, among the many possible norms, one may choose absolute, 
Euclidean or Chebyshev norm. Accordingly, the composite index would vary.  
There are other two methods that deserve mention here. The first of them is 
Pena’s method (Somarriba & Pena, 2009) and the second is the one proposed by 
Becker et al., (2017). Pena’s method sequentially finds the explanatory power (R2) 
of each leading indicator variable net of the other trailing indicator variables and 
assigns weights to the indicator variables accordingly. Becker et al., (2017) use the 
correlation ratios and optimize its function to obtain weights.  
 
Table 6. Different Dimensions and Synthetic Indices of Globalization in Select Asian 
Countries 
Country Year* E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 88.27 
Cyprus 2008 93.50 84.06 88.10 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 86.04466 
Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.09249 
Qatar 2014 77.52 84.43 78.83 72.34 89.65 72.57 78.49 79.1897 
Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 77.38491 
Jordan 2005 80.57 60.04 68.99 67.45 40.71 84.27 70.17 72.86044 
Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.30 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.50 71.16785 
Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 70.66232 
Kuwait 2009 59.15 77.58 79.06 76.88 90.41 59.79 70.99 70.34469 
Bahrain 2007 95.39 82.72 87.67 69.57 43.66 43.80 67.85 70.3223 
Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.10 72.26 70.15894 
Saudi_Arabia 1993 48.19 76.19 71.10 29.62 75.95 71.77 62.50 70.13246 
Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.90 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 67.57002 
Brune 2014 75.84 81.56 72.23 84.52 43.51 54.05 67.60 67.20363 
Korea_Rep. 2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.91502 
Russian_Fed. 2013 61.73 45.75 43.65 73.80 81.93 91.62 68.88 65.27114 
Georgia 2013 78.44 85.96 56.84 75.82 39.20 49.37 64.21 62.73205 
Oman 2014 78.55 82.90 59.43 72.22 39.42 45.74 62.66 61.32702 
Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.40 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 60.54658 
Armenia 2014 64.89 71.54 48.41 77.23 1.68 66.99 58.89 59.72001 
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Kazakhstan 2012 81.17 54.03 53.77 70.97 1.86 68.59 58.97 59.67099 
Philippines 2004 65.02 58.69 31.13 49.26 39.90 81.03 59.20 59.47478 
China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 57.46764 
Kyrgyzstan 2013 65.70 61.89 39.43 75.43 2.48 65.90 55.79 54.82688 
Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.40 1.43 71.89 56.91 54.78246 
Azerbaijan 2013 58.58 64.16 38.63 78.75 35.07 60.22 57.50 53.84511 
Pakistan 2002 29.82 50.40 31.51 41.45 32.38 84.27 50.65 53.50246 
Sri Lanka 2007 47.08 46.86 35.64 54.40 33.50 74.53 52.60 52.51512 
India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.10 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 52.26477 
Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 51.4205 
Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 50.98426 
United_Arab 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1.00 52.73 48.93 49.79375 
Yemen 2009 46.31 63.83 25.35 42.40 1.31 64.78 46.15 48.55389 
Tajikistan 2012 42.12 57.24 26.44 53.65 1.00 61.87 45.26 45.55294 
Bangladesh 2013 29.79 41.19 25.78 42.07 1.56 76.18 42.43 45.12315 
Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 44.96274 
Iran 2013 25.33 34.55 29.99 69.07 1.12 67.69 42.35 40.79011 
Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 40.36511 
Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1.00 44.74 39.03 37.29294 
Note: Year* = Year in the span 1970-2014 for which AEMC obtains largest value representing 
highest globalization attained 
 
7. The present study 
In this study we construct a composite index of globalization by a method 
proposed by Mishra (2016). It obtains weights for indicator variables such that the 
Euclidean norm of their Shapley values in explaining the composite index is 
minimized. Thus we get almost ‘equi-marginal contribution’ solution of weights to 
construct the composite index. Shapley values (that have uniqueness, efficiency, 
symmetry, linearity and anonymity properties) are mean expected marginal 
contributions to the value of a coalition game (Roth, 1988).  
 
Table 7. Shapley Value of Constituent Variables in KOF and AEMC Indices and their 
Euclidean Norm 
Globalization Aspect E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P Norm 
Shapley Value (KOF) 0.17952 0.15176 0.11351 0.21295 0.19581 0.14613 0.41616 
Shapley Value (AEMC) 0.16556 0.16578 0.16584 0.17065 0.16612 0.16605 0.40827 
AEMC Weights 0.33639 0.52417 0.67645 0.00186 0.15866 0.82650 - 
 
We have used the indicators of different dimensions of globalization from the 
KOF study-1917: economic (E1 and E2), social (S1, S2 and S3) and political (P) 
for 45 years, 1970 through 2014, and for 39 countries in Asia. For some Asian 
countries, data were deficient and thus such countries were dropped out from our 
analysis. Unlike the KOF study that constructs the composite index at two stages 
(at the first stage making E from E1 and E2, S from S1, S2 and S3 and then at the 
second stage obtaining the final index by synthesizing E, S and P), we have 
synthesized  E1, E2, S1, S2, S3 and P at one go. It may be noted that in making the 
index at two stages, we lose the information content of EiSj, PSi and PEi. After all, 
economic, social and political indicators are not orthogonal to each other. 
The main findings of our study are presented in Table-6 and Table-7. In Table-6 
we present values of E1 through P, the KOF index and the best value of AEMC 
indices of globalization in 1970-2014. In Table-7 we present the Shapley values 
obtained by the constituent variables (E1, E2, S1, S2, S3 and P) for the Almost 
Equi-marginal Contribution (AEMC) index and their Euclidean norm. For 
comparison the corresponding Shapley values and their Euclidean norm for the 
KOF index of globalization also are presented. We observe that the AEMC norm is 
a little less than the KOF norm and the Shapley values for the former are more 
equitably distributed than those of the latter. The weights obtained by S2 (flow of 
information) is the least although its Shapley value is the largest (0.17065). On the 
other hand, although P (political dimension) gets the largest weight, its Shapley 
value is comparable to others.  
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Figure 1. Mean and Gini Coefficient of Globalization Indexes 1970-2014 
 
8. Trends in growth and disparities in globalization 
Over the years since 1970, the mean level of globalization in Asian countries 
has increased. Its growth rate accelerated after 1991 but started tapering off since 
2007 or so. Disparities in globalization over the Asian countries were more or less 
constant up to 1985 but after that they started declining (vide Fig-1 and Table-8). 
We have measured disparities by the Gini coefficient (scaled up to lie between zero 
and 100).  
 
Table 8. Trends in the Measures of Globalization in Asian Countries – 1970-2014 
Year 
Gini Cefficient (Per Cent) Over Countries of Measures Arithmetic Mean Over Countries of Measures 
ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC 
1970 25.839 32.772 22.914 19.542 21.283 35.082 24.364 31.081 30.022 31.906 
1971 28.603 34.061 25.074 21.137 22.468 37.809 26.704 29.847 31.514 33.391 
1972 28.372 34.181 24.616 20.891 22.179 37.646 26.635 30.714 31.669 33.640 
1973 28.950 34.352 23.156 20.908 22.166 38.448 26.564 33.149 32.598 34.704 
1974 28.503 34.547 22.237 20.210 21.274 38.597 26.497 35.143 33.176 35.462 
1975 28.489 34.841 22.739 20.904 22.151 38.813 26.389 35.627 33.348 35.680 
1976 28.400 34.812 22.678 20.712 21.879 38.854 26.498 37.101 33.809 36.246 
1977 28.233 34.806 22.586 20.658 21.827 38.904 26.599 38.115 34.142 36.641 
1978 28.542 35.944 21.529 20.632 21.436 38.988 27.146 39.513 34.761 37.271 
1979 27.841 36.312 20.760 20.351 20.955 38.806 27.367 40.695 35.104 37.507 
1980 28.065 36.310 19.367 20.859 21.731 39.365 27.426 39.526 35.002 37.230 
1981 27.686 35.392 19.004 20.873 21.732 40.176 27.840 39.547 35.448 37.675 
1982 27.499 35.270 18.481 20.967 21.699 40.530 28.336 39.465 35.734 37.886 
1983 27.525 35.327 19.815 21.782 22.513 40.491 28.984 39.565 35.988 38.052 
1984 27.177 36.198 22.203 21.910 22.538 41.463 30.747 38.907 36.802 38.677 
1985 26.866 35.678 21.307 21.199 21.754 41.822 31.310 40.108 37.470 39.332 
1986 26.946 35.612 20.840 21.235 21.780 41.832 31.651 40.411 37.681 39.464 
1987 26.479 35.814 19.887 21.150 21.737 42.084 31.666 39.650 37.566 39.228 
1988 26.060 35.296 22.033 20.423 20.815 42.507 32.054 41.123 38.266 39.993 
1989 25.400 35.127 22.669 20.489 21.130 43.168 32.206 41.963 38.788 40.532 
1990 25.346 33.719 22.154 19.729 20.299 42.928 32.783 43.384 39.308 40.995 
1991 22.880 31.524 28.741 19.576 20.268 44.213 32.630 41.810 39.273 41.035 
1992 21.593 31.910 26.853 19.361 19.610 44.787 33.318 45.502 40.749 42.686 
1993 20.840 32.201 26.353 19.173 19.323 45.480 34.395 48.593 42.246 44.307 
1994 20.324 32.507 25.953 18.688 18.617 46.419 35.730 49.326 43.273 45.174 
1995 19.849 31.466 24.239 17.905 17.762 47.512 37.027 49.696 44.243 45.834 
1996 19.590 30.685 23.808 17.871 17.596 49.009 39.053 50.702 45.801 47.043 
1997 19.002 30.184 23.026 17.626 17.405 50.889 40.566 51.840 47.339 48.221 
1998 18.177 28.410 21.940 17.071 17.044 52.008 42.237 51.989 48.395 48.725 
1999 17.594 26.907 21.428 16.226 16.416 53.752 43.844 53.463 50.015 50.113 
2000 16.898 25.710 21.154 15.467 15.939 55.974 45.314 55.336 51.862 51.664 
2001 15.523 25.743 20.912 14.998 15.272 55.840 46.552 56.538 52.603 52.124 
2002 15.113 25.136 20.234 14.393 14.643 55.824 47.075 57.613 53.087 52.563 
2003 15.155 25.239 18.966 14.200 14.258 56.513 46.913 59.084 53.677 53.352 
2004 15.494 24.571 18.981 14.199 14.465 58.116 47.827 59.644 54.738 54.414 
2005 14.953 24.239 18.122 13.576 13.632 59.436 48.141 60.607 55.589 55.256 
2006 14.388 23.512 16.727 13.069 13.123 60.130 49.216 63.183 56.942 56.497 
2007 14.964 23.653 15.577 13.567 13.654 60.512 49.926 65.209 57.899 57.338 
2008 15.438 23.629 14.196 13.317 13.391 59.692 49.892 67.282 58.166 57.755 
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2009 15.502 23.384 13.908 13.300 13.296 59.921 49.927 67.900 58.431 58.000 
2010 15.521 23.086 13.824 12.997 13.100 60.751 50.316 68.286 58.975 58.313 
2011 15.512 22.592 13.833 12.516 12.571 60.298 50.301 68.078 58.753 57.911 
2012 14.793 22.495 13.017 12.061 11.910 60.887 50.552 69.203 59.364 58.571 
2013 14.249 22.866 13.116 12.092 11.863 61.421 50.876 68.825 59.568 58.607 
2014 14.832 22.352 12.051 11.809 11.647 62.082 51.131 69.523 60.091 59.077 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean and Gini Coefficient of Dimensions of Globalization Sub-Indexes 1970-
2014 
 
Table 9. Trends in Dispersion (Absolute Distance) of Globalization in Asian Countries-
1970-2014 
Year ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC Year ECO SOC POL KOF AEMC 
1970 9.065 7.985 7.122 5.867 6.791 1993 9.478 11.076 12.806 8.100 8.561 
1971 10.814 9.096 7.484 6.661 7.502 1994 9.434 11.615 12.802 8.087 8.410 
1972 10.681 9.104 7.561 6.616 7.461 1995 9.431 11.651 12.046 7.922 8.141 
1973 11.131 9.125 7.676 6.816 7.693 1996 9.601 11.983 12.071 8.185 8.278 
1974 11.001 9.154 7.815 6.705 7.544 1997 9.670 12.245 11.937 8.344 8.393 
1975 11.057 9.194 8.101 6.971 7.903 1998 9.454 12.000 11.406 8.261 8.305 
1976 11.035 9.224 8.414 7.003 7.930 1999 9.457 11.797 11.456 8.115 8.227 
1977 10.984 9.258 8.608 7.053 7.998 2000 9.459 11.650 11.706 8.021 8.235 
1978 11.128 9.757 8.507 7.172 7.989 2001 8.668 11.984 11.823 7.890 7.960 
1979 10.804 9.938 8.448 7.144 7.860 2002 8.437 11.833 11.657 7.641 7.697 
1980 11.048 9.958 7.655 7.301 8.091 2003 8.564 11.840 11.206 7.622 7.607 
1981 11.123 9.853 7.516 7.399 8.188 2004 9.005 11.751 11.321 7.772 7.871 
1982 11.145 9.994 7.293 7.493 8.221 2005 8.888 11.669 10.983 7.547 7.532 
1983 11.145 10.239 7.840 7.839 8.567 2006 8.652 11.572 10.568 7.442 7.414 
1984 11.268 11.130 8.638 8.063 8.717 2007 9.055 11.809 10.157 7.855 7.829 
1985 11.236 11.171 8.546 7.943 8.556 2008 9.215 11.789 9.551 7.746 7.734 
1986 11.272 11.271 8.422 8.001 8.595 2009 9.289 11.675 9.444 7.771 7.712 
1987 11.143 11.341 7.885 7.945 8.527 2010 9.429 11.616 9.440 7.665 7.639 
1988 11.077 11.314 9.061 7.815 8.325 2011 9.354 11.364 9.417 7.353 7.280 
1989 10.964 11.313 9.512 7.947 8.564 2012 9.007 11.372 9.008 7.160 6.976 
1990 10.880 11.054 9.611 7.755 8.322 2013 8.752 11.633 9.027 7.203 6.953 
1991 10.116 10.286 12.017 7.688 8.317 2014 9.208 11.429 8.378 7.096 6.880 
1992 9.671 10.632 12.219 7.889 8.371 Medi 9.671 10.632 12.219 7.889 8.371 
 
Here it will be pertinent to note that the Gini coefficient is like the coefficient of 
variation (CV), the expected distance with respect to arithmetic mean. In case of 
the Coeff. of Variation (CV) the distance is Euclidean while in case of the Gini 
coefficient the distance is absolute. Stated explicitly, 
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mean values are increasing over time, CV as well as Gini coefficient may fall fast 
even when the measure of dispersion )2/(|| 2
11
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n
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n
i
   is not so fast 
decreasing. This has been shown in Fig-3 (Table-9). It may be seen that fall in D 
started only since 1998 and its magnitude is not very different than what it was 
about 1976 or so. Furthermore, in social dimension of globalization much 
significant decline has not been there, while in political dimension there was a 
steep rise during 1988-1993, followed by a fast decline after 1994, trailing the 
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dissolution of the USSR. As to the economic globalization, it started faltering after 
2006 onwards. 
 
 
Figure 3. Trends in Absolute Dispersion of Globalization 1970-2014 
 
9. Relationship of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization 
with other socio-economic indices 
Now let us look into the association of globalization with some important socio-
economic indicators (Table-10). These indicators are as follows. 
(i). Economic Freedom Index: Economists have always argued that freedom of 
individuals to pursue their self-interest results into the social good and therefore 
economic development. In constructing this index (EFI) property rights, freedom 
from corruption, fiscal freedom, lesser govt. spending, business freedom, monetary 
freedom, labour freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom and financial 
freedom are accounted for. It is obvious that such freedom is congenial to 
globalization. Indeed we find that globalization indices are highly correlated with 
the index of economic freedom (Table-11 and Table-12). 
(ii). International Innovation Index (INV): This is a global index measuring the 
level of innovation of a country, considering the business outcomes of innovation 
and government's ability to encourage and support innovation through public 
policy. It is expected that this index should be positively correlated with the index 
of globalization. Indeed we find that it is so (Table-11 and Table-12).  
(iii). Social Progress Index: measures the extent to which countries provide for 
the social and environmental needs of their citizens. The index is based on a large 
number of indicators in the areas of basic human needs, foundations of well-being 
and opportunity to progress.  This index (SPI) is strongly and positively correlated 
with the index of globalization (Table-11 and Table-12). 
  
Table 10. Globalization Indices and Some Other Important Socio-economic Indices 
Country KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
Singapore 88.27 88.27 87.8 2.45 60 0.925 84 6.38 0.712 
Cyprus 86.045 87.32 67.9 0.63 77.45 0.856 55 7.65 0.684 
Israel 80.092 78.15 70.5 1.36 72.6 0.899 64 7.85 0.719 
Qatar 79.19 78.49 70.8 0.52 60 0.856 61 3.18 0.643 
Malaysia 77.385 79.12 70.8 1.12 69.55 0.789 49 6.54 0.666 
Jordan 72.86 70.17 69.3 -0.15 63.31 0.741 48 3.96 0.603 
Lebanon 71.168 70.5 59.3 - 61.85 0.763 28 4.86 0.598 
Turkey 70.662 71.33 63.2 -0.21 66.24 0.767 41 5.04 0.623 
Kuwait 70.345 70.99 62.5 0.06 69.19 0.8 41 3.85 0.624 
Bahrain 70.322 67.85 73.4 0.21 57 0.824 43 2.79 0.615 
Japan 70.159 72.26 73.3 1.79 83.15 0.903 72 7.99 0.66 
Saudi_Arabia 70.132 62.5 62.1 -0.12 64.27 0.847 46 1.93 0.583 
Thailand 67.57 72.06 62.4 0.12 66.34 0.74 35 4.92 0.699 
Brunei 67.204 67.6 68.9 - - 0.865 58 - 0.669 
Korea_Rep. 66.915 67.03 71.5 2.26 77.7 0.901 53 7.92 0.649 
Russian_Fed. 65.271 68.88 52.1 -0.09 63.64 0.804 29 3.24 0.691 
Georgia 62.732 64.21 73 -0.75 65.89 0.769 57 5.93 0.681 
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Oman 61.327 62.66 66.7 -0.15 70 0.796 45 3.04 0.612 
Indonesia 60.547 59.65 58.1 -0.57 60.47 0.689 37 6.97 0.682 
Armenia 59.72 58.89 67.1 -0.66 65.7 0.743 33 3.88 0.669 
Kazakhstan 59.671 58.97 63.3 -0.23 61.38 0.794 29 3.06 0.718 
Philippines 59.475 59.2 62.2 -0.15 65.46 0.682 35 6.94 0.786 
China 57.468 62.02 52.7 0.73 59.07 0.738 40 3.14 0.676 
Kyrgyzstan 54.827 55.79 61.3 -0.77 58.58 0.664 28 4.93 0.687 
Mongolia 54.782 56.91 59.2 -0.89 61.52 0.735 38 6.62 0.705 
Azerbaijan 53.845 57.5 61 -0.54 62.62 0.759 30 2.65 0.684 
Pakistan 53.502 50.65 55.6 -0.82 45.66 0.55 32 4.33 0.556 
SriLanka 52.515 52.6 58.6 -0.56 60.1 0.766 36 6.48 0.673 
India 52.265 52.38 54.6 0.06 53.06 0.624 40 7.81 0.683 
Vietnam 51.421 56.69 51.7 -0.65 55 0.683 33 3.38 0.7 
Cambodia 50.984 50.69 57.5 - 53.96 0.563 21 4.27 0.658 
United_Arab 49.794 48.93 72.4 - 72.79 0.536 66 2.75 0.639 
Yemen 48.554 46.15 53.7 - 40.3 0.482 14 2.07 0.516 
Tajikistan 45.553 45.26 52.7 -0.99 56.49 0.627 25 1.89 0.679 
Bangladesh 45.123 42.43 53.9 - 53.39 0.579 26 5.73 0.698 
Bhutan 44.963 43.58 57.4 - 60 0.607 65 4.93 0.642 
Iran 40.79 42.35 41.8 - 56.82 0.774 29 2.34 0.587 
Nepal 40.365 38.18 51.3 -1.05 55.33 0.558 29 4.86 0.661 
Myanmar 37.293 39.03 46.9 - 46.12 0.556 28 4.2 - 
Sources:  
CPI (2016):       [Retrieved from].    
HDI (2015):       [Retrieved from].     
EFI  (2014):       [Retrieved from].      
DEMI (2016):   [Retrieved from].     
SPI  (2015):       [Retrieved from].      
INV (2009):      [Retrieved from].     
GGP (2016):     [Retrieved from].    
 
(iv). Human Development Index: It is a well-known index (HDI) that measures 
a country’s achievement on  life expectancy, education, and per capita income 
indicators. AEMC and KOF globalization indexes are strongly and positively 
correlated with the HDI (Table 11 and Table 12). 
(v). Corruption Perception Index: Corruption discourages inflow of capital. It 
impedes economic functions either by delays or by increasing the cost. It 
introduces several types of system-made risks and resistances. Transparency 
International publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)  - score and ranking 
of countries  -  by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI generally defines corruption as "the 
misuse of public power for private benefit". The values of this index lie between 0 
and 100; higher for less corrupt and lower for more corrupt. Kendall’s tau between 
AEMC index and CPI is 0.4493 and that between KOF index and CPI is 0.4547 
(Table-11 and Table-12). The corresponding values for Spearman’s Rho are 0.5835 
and 0.5939. Thus, less corrupt countries are more globalized. 
 
Table 11. Kendall’s Tau of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization with other socio-
economic  indices 
 
Globalization Indices Other Socio-Economic Indices 
Indices KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
KOF 1.0000 0.8758 0.5527 0.6213 0.5018 0.6077 0.4547 0.2236 0.0869 
AEMC 0.8758 1.0000 0.5770 0.5566 0.4619 0.5969 0.4493 0.2066 0.0100 
EFI 0.5527 0.5770 1.0000 0.4560 0.5339 0.4949 0.5617 0.1869 -0.0014 
INV 0.6213 0.5566 0.4560 1.0000 0.3792 0.5965 0.5495 0.1871 0.0139 
SPI 0.5018 0.4619 0.5339 0.3792 1.0000 0.4950 0.4648 0.2198 0.0572 
HDI 0.6077 0.5969 0.4949 0.5965 0.4950 1.0000 0.4673 0.1140 0.0428 
CPI 0.4547 0.4493 0.5617 0.5495 0.4648 0.4673 1.0000 0.2473 -0.0345 
DEMI 0.2236 0.2066 0.1869 0.1871 0.2198 0.1140 0.2473 1.0000 0.2904 
GGP 0.0869 0.0100 -0.0014 0.0139 0.0572 0.0428 -0.0345 0.2904 1.0000 
Notes: CPI = Corruption Perception Index; HDI = Human Development Index; EFI = Economic 
Freedom Index; DEMI = Democracy Index; SPI = Social Progress Index; INV =International 
Innovation Index;  GGP = Gender Gap Index. 
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Table 12. Spearman’s Rho of AEMC and KOF indices of globalization with other socio-
economic  indices 
 
Globalization Indices Other Socio-Economic Indices 
Indices KOF AEMC EFI INV SPI HDI CPI DEMI GGP 
KOF 1.0000 0.9753 0.7116 0.7953 0.6701 0.7915 0.5939 0.3148 0.1112 
AEMC 0.9753 1.0000 0.7400 0.7301 0.6347 0.7840 0.5835 0.2884 0.0253 
EFI 0.7116 0.7400 1.0000 0.5862 0.6898 0.6316 0.7423 0.2734 -0.0080 
INV 0.7953 0.7301 0.5862 1.0000 0.4840 0.7427 0.7172 0.2914 -0.0076 
SPI 0.6701 0.6347 0.6898 0.4840 1.0000 0.6147 0.6246 0.3026 0.0659 
HDI 0.7915 0.7840 0.6316 0.7427 0.6147 1.0000 0.5834 0.1743 0.0602 
CPI 0.5939 0.5835 0.7423 0.7172 0.6246 0.5834 1.0000 0.3572 -0.0393 
DEMI 0.3148 0.2884 0.2734 0.2914 0.3026 0.1743 0.3572 1.0000 0.4207 
GGP 0.1112 0.0253 -0.0080 -0.0076 0.0659 0.0602 -0.0393 0.4207 1.0000 
Notes: CPI = Corruption Perception Index; HDI = Human Development Index; EFI = Economic 
Freedom Index; DEMI = Democracy Index; SPI = Social Progress Index; INV =International 
Innovation Index;  GGP = Gender Gap Index. 
 
 (vi). Democracy Index (DEMI): This index is based on a large number of 
indicators grouped in five different categories measuring pluralism, civil liberties 
and political culture. In addition to giving score and ranking the countries 
accordingly, this index categorises the countries into four categories namely full 
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. It 
may be noted that democracies (full or flawed) and authoritarianism can both go in 
for or against globalization depending on many socio-economic and political 
considerations. There have been plus points as well as minus points with 
globalization that governments have to weigh since the political parties in 
opposition and the press bring them to the public view. A reference to Lee thesis 
may also be made which hypothesizes that democracy hurts economic growth and 
development. Knutsen (2010) finds that there is no significant, average effect of 
democracy on growth, possibly due to nonlinearity that may give the relationship a 
U shape (Libman, 2008). It is likely, therefore, that the relationship of globalization 
indices may not be as strong with DEMI as with other indicators that are closely 
connected with economic development. We find weak positive relationship 
(although statistically significant) with the indices of globalization and DEMI.  
(vii). Gender Gap index (GGP):  This index summarizes equality in economic 
participation and outcomes, educational attainment, health and survival, and 
political empowerment of women vis-à-vis those of men. We find that this index 
has very poor or no relationship not only with globalization indices but also with 
other indices such as CPI, HDI, EFI, SPI, INV. Democracy Index (DMI) only has a 
considerable positive association (Spearman’s Rho = 0.4207, see Table-12) with 
GGP.   
Overall, we find that economic indicators (EFI, SPI and INV) and socio-
economic indicators (HDI and CPI) are more strongly correlated with globalization 
index while political indicator (DEMI) and gender equality indicator (GGP) are 
weakly associated with the globalization index. 
 
10. Concluding remarks 
In this study we have constructed a composite index of globalization of Asian 
countries during 1970-2014 by minimizing the Euclidean norm of Shapley values 
of indicator variables contributing to the overall index. As a consequence, the mean 
expected marginal contributions of constituent variable to the overall index are 
approximately equal and thus, the overall composite index represents the 
constituent variables optimally. We call this index the Almost Equal Marginal 
Contribution (AEMC) index. We compare this index with the KOF index of 
globalization and find that they are highly correlated (Pearson’s r=0.982).  We find 
that Singapore, Cyprus, Israel, Qatar, Malaysia, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Japan have done very well and scored above 0.7. At the other end, 
Yemen, Tajikistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Nepal and Myanmar have scored 
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only below 0.5. Trends in globalization are increasing in general, but the rate of 
globalization, which accelerated after 1991, lost its momentum after 2007. 
Disparities in globalization, as measured by Gini coefficient over the Asian 
countries, were more or less constant up to 1985 but after that they started 
declining.   
We have found that the index of globalization fares well with other socio-
economic measures such as Economic Freedom Index, International Innovation 
Index, Social Progress Index, Human Development Index and Corruption 
Perception Index, showing high values of Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s Rho. Its 
association with Democracy Index is rather weak but positive. It is almost 
uncorrelated with the Gender Gap Index. We observe, therefore, that globalization 
index is moving well with the indices of socio-economic condition in the Asian 
countries.  
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